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ARGUMENT 
L This Court's Recent Decision In Blizzard v. Lundeby Docs Not Alter The 
Conclusion That The Trial Court Acted Outside Its Discretion In Granting 
A New Trial. 
Since Defendant's opening brief was filed in this second appeal, this Court issued its 
decision in Blizzard v. Lundeby,_ Idaho_, 322 P.3d 286 (March 27, 2014). As this Court is 
aware, in Blizzard the trial court concluded that it could not find that a new trial would produce a 
different result, because the first jury had only answered questions rcgmding negligence and had 
not reached questions of causation and damages. 322 P.3d at 288. In deciding that such a 
conclusion constituted an abuse of discretion, this Court ruled that a district court "must consider 
whether it is more probable than not that a different or more favorable result, as rendered by the 
questions the jury answered and only those questions the jury answered, would be obtained by a 
new trial." 322 P .3d at 290. The situation addressed in Blizzard docs not apply in the present 
case, since the jury answered all relevant questions. 
Significantly, this Court also took the occasion in Blizzard to reject a more stringent 
standard of review, such as a ''manifest abuse of discretion," and instead restated the traditional 
"abuse of discretion" test in reviewing a new trial order. 322 P.3d at 288, citing, inter alia, 
Burggraf v. Chaffin, 121 Idaho 171, 173, 823 P.2d 77 5, 777 (199 l ). Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. 
Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)); Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'! ;\;fed. 
Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 782, 25 P.3d 88, 95 (2001 ). The Court also noted that the ",",'rm Valley test" 
for abuse of discretion is consistent with the language of Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 772, 
727 P .2d 11 87, 1200 (1986), where the Court examined the following factors: "( l) whether the 
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trial court judge applied the correct standard: (2) · an actual exercise of judgment and a 
consideration of the facts and circumstances .... ' and (3) whether the judge violated the restraints 
on his discretion by disregarding relevant factual consideration or principles of law." 322 P.3d at 
n.3. 
As set forth in Appellant's Brief, it is principally this third factor set forth in Quick v. 
Crane that is at issue in this appeal. 
2. The Trial Court Disregarded Relevant Principles Of Law By Reformulating 
Plaintiff's Theory Of Recovery. 
Plaintiff's prosecuted this action, as was its prerogative, on the sole theory that the 
transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant constituted a simple "loan" for which it was entitled 
to be repaid. Disregarding this choice, the trial court based its grant of a new trial on an 
alternative theory that the failure to consummate the "buy-in" constituted a breach on 
Defendant's part: 
And Berryhill also testified as cited in his brief that there's no doubt in his mind at 
that time that the transition would occur. That is a meeting of the minds and that 
there's no buy-in, so there was no transition. That equals a breach and there 
needs to be a determination as to the amount of damages, if any. 
Supp. Tr., p. 35, II. 20-25. In its Memorandum Decision and Order granting a new trial, the trial 
court further stated: 
Thus, although Mosel] Equities performed its obligations to Berryhill & Company 
under the contract by providing the requisite funds, Berryhill & Company did not 
completely perform its obligations within a reasonable time by failing to 
transition the funds into a 'buy-in.' Therefore, the clear weight of the evidence 
establishes that Berryhill & Company breached the express contract. 
Supp. Tr., p. l 07. 
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Somehow, however, Plaintiff argues that the trial court did not recast its theory of 
recovery. 1 Thus, while Plaintiff pied, argued and tried its case on the basis that Defendant 
breached an alleged "loan" agreement,2 the trial court now substitutes a "buy-in" agreement as 
the source of Defendant's alleged breach. 3 Yet, Plaintiff continues to insist on its own evidence 
that the funds constituted a "loan."4 Respondent's Br., p. 7. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that it 
should be repaid as if the funds were a loan, even if they were for a ''buy-in" agreement that it 
affirmatively disclaimed. 5 Respondent's Br., p. 12. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. Subsequent references to this filing are cited to 
"Respondent's Br." by page number. 
2 PlaintitTs Count One for breach of express contract first appears in its /\mended 
Complaint: "Mosell Equities loaned money to ... Berryhill & Company and [it] agreed to repay 
the debt as indicated in writing in Exhibit A [Trial Exhibit l]. After reql1esting repayment. 
... Berryhill & Company denied the parties had contracted, asserted that no loan existed, and 
refused to repay the loan. By refusing to repay the loan, ... Berryhill & Company are in breach 
and that breach is material." R., p. 94, iii! 16-18. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint set 
forth the exact same "loan" theory as Count One. R., p. 914, ~!ii 16-18. 
3 Of course, this alternative theory arises after this Court decided in the first appeal 
that "there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that the 
payments were not loans." Afosell Equities. LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,276 (2013) 
("Afosell J"). 
4 Even the trial court now is convinced the funds were not a loan. Supp. Tr., p. 83, 
II. 11-19 ("But one thing they didn't get is we're not saying we ever made a loan, and I think 
you're probably right, there was never a meeting of the minds that we're making a simple loan 
agreement here. Mosell's never testified to that. Berryhill's never testified to that. None of the 
agents ever testified to that. They all said we could never understand. And the court's never said 
that because I never could really understand exactly where was the meeting of the minds.") 
5 The trial court noted this fact. Supp. Tr., p. 82, 11. I 0-13. J\s argued earlier, 
Plaintiff further failed to submit jury instructions based on this theory. 
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Neither the trial court, nor Plaintiff, attempt to justify this reformulation in the face of 
Defendant's citation lo 1/eitz v. Carroll, 117 ldaho 373,376, 788 P.2d 188 (1990) ("[t]his Court 
has long recognized that 'the parties to an action arc hound hy the theory on which they try it."') 
(citations omitted). Defendant fails to distinguish or even cite to Heitz and the prior authority on 
which it is based. Defendant similarly fails to distinguish or cite to Brown v. City of Pocatello, 
148 Idaho 802, 808 (20 l 0), where this Court stated: 
Without a clear and concise statement sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on 
notice of the plaintiff"s theories of recovery that must be defended against, 
whether in the body of the complaint or in the prayer for relief, it cannot he said 
that a cause of action was sufficiently pied. Even under the liberal notice 
pleading standard, a complaint must reasonably imply the theory upon which 
relief is being sought. 
In basing its order granting a new trial on an impermissible new theory, the trial court acted 
outside the boundaries of its discretion. 
3. The Trial Court Disregarded Relevant Factual Considerations. 
In lvlosell I this Court concluded that, as to any express contract between the parties, 
"there were genuine issues as to what the terms of that contract were, whether it was amended, 
and whether it was breached." 154 Idaho at 276. The trial court disregarded the relevant factual 
evidence upon which this Court reached its conclusion. This Court had no difficulty describing 
the evidence on the basis of the record, but the same evidence went mostly unaddressed in the 
trial court's decision regarding a new trial: 
Mosel] Equities called Mr. Mosel! as a witness, and he testified that he was 
interested in owning a half-interest in a restaurant and desired to invest in 
Berryhill & Company's restaurant because it was profitable and would give him 
cash flow. He also thought that he could enhance its value by bringing 
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opportunity to it because he was a partner in Polo Cove and because of his real 
estate background. Initially, he and Mr. Berryhill intended to be co-mvners of a 
holding company called Mo Berry, Inc., (mentioned in Exhibit 1) that would own 
Berryhill & Company. Mr. Mosel! would invest $387.000 in that entity and Mr. 
Berryhill would invest the stock of Berryhill & Company. Later, they decided that 
Mr. Mosell would simply purchase a one-half interest in Berryhill & Company for 
$400,000, even though a one-half interest in that company was not worth that 
much. He testified that the checks to Berryhill & Company were loans because 
Mr. Berryhill wanted to move his restaurant to downtown Boise, and it was also 
Mr. Berryhill's idea to expand the leased space in downtown Boise in order to 
have ballrooms and other facilities and so that he could move the catering 
business to that location. The loaned money totaling $405,000 was to be applied 
to purchase the one-half interest in Berryhill & Company, but Mr. Berryhili did 
not go through with the agreement. Mr. Moscll stated that Polo Cove was a non-
entity, and that his reference to Mr. Berryhill as a partner in that project did not 
refer to a legal partnership, but only that Mr. Berryhill was acting in a 
collaborative or supportive effort for the development which has now been 
shelved. 
Mosel! Equities also called Mr. Berryhill as a witness to testify in its case in chief 
about the transaction between him and Mr. Mosell. Mr. Berryhill testified that 
when Mr. Mosel! asked him if be would build a restaurant in the proposed Polo 
Cove development, Mr. Berryhill refused to do so and told him that 90% of new 
restaurants fail. Mr. Berryhill did not want to build a restaurant in the Polo Cove 
development on bis own, and Mr. Mosell did not want to own a restaurant. They 
therefore decided to be partners in the development. Mr. Berryhill worked 
extensively on Polo Cove through July or August of 2008, working with the 
architects. Although be was initially paid consulting fees, he agreed that they stop 
because Mr. Mosel! said he was going to be making much more money from the 
development. They agreed to be partners in the Polo Cove development because 
Mr. Mosell needed his expertise, name, and knowledge in order to have the type 
or restaurant that Mr. Mosel! wanted, and Mr. Berryhill needed Mr. Mosel! in 
order to build a restaurant in the development. As they were working on Polo 
Cove, Mr. Mosel! eventually suggested that Berryhill & Company's restaurant be 
moved from the strip mall on Broadway to the downtown area because he wanled 
to "build a sexy, downtown location restaurant, showcase for Polo Cove, to bring 
investors to, so he didn't have to take them to a strip mall, so he could sell them 
on the aspect of Polo Cove." Mr. Berryhill agreed to the move because he viewed 
it as pari of the Polo Cove development. It was necessary to make tenant 
improvements before moving into the leased space. The first check was to pay 
some of the bills that were due for improvements and to pay Ben-yhill & 
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Company's payroll. Its bookkeeper had recently died, and the new bookkeeper 
had lost the electronic financial records when she transferred them to her home 
computer. When Mr. Berryhill saw the check, he asked why the word "loan" was 
written on the check, because they had never discussed the money as a loan. Mr. 
Mosell stated that for tax purposes they had to call it a loan until they could work 
out the terms of their formal relationship. After the restaurant was moved to the 
downtown location, Mr. Mosel] wanted to expand the leased space in order to 
improve marketing of the Polo Cove development. Mr. Berryhill would not have 
agreed to either the move downtown or the expansion had it not been to promote 
the Polo Cove development. 
In the Defendants' case in chief, Mr. Berryhill testified that he had no desire to 
expand the leased downtown space on his own because the restaurant could not 
support the extra rental payments. Mr. Mosell said he would fond the ballrooms 
and Polo Cove would pay for the showroom. A few months after the expansion 
was completed, Mosell Equities stopped making the rent payments for the 
expanded space and Mr. Mosel! tem1inated his relationship with Mr. Berryhill. 
The Polo Cove development was the only reason that the restaurant was moved to 
the downtown location and the only reason for the expansion. Now, Berryhill & 
Company has about the same income it did at its location on Broadway, but it is 
paying $15,000 to $20,000 more in rent each month, and, as of April 17, 2010, it 
was$ J 49,255 in arrears in rental payments and late fees for the expansion. He 
also testified that the cost of the tenant improvements for the restaurant was 
$100,048.43, and the cost of the tenant improvements for the expansion was 
$ I 93,801.29, all of which \Vere paid by Berryhill & Company. In addition, there 
arc monthly impact fees that Berryhill & Company pays to the city. 
154 Idaho at 273-274. 
Rather than consider this evidence with particularity, the trial court dismisses 
Defendant's contrary evidence as a "branding" theory by which Defendant claims that Plaintiff 
bcnefittccl from the Berryhill name. Supp. Tr., p. l 05. Although a district court may be "in a far 
better position to weigh the demeanor, crdibility and testimony of witnesses, and the 
persuasiveness of the evidence," Craig Johnson Constr., L.L.C., v. Floyd Tavvn Architects, P.A., 
142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648,561 (2006), here the trial court failed to explain how its 
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decision was based on any of these factors. Rather, the trial court based its conclusion on an 
erroneous legal conclusion that there ·'was a clear express agreement. The clear weight of the 
authority was that that agreement was never~ was performed on behalf of Mosel! Equities, but 
not performed on behalf of Berryhill. That's a breach." Supp. Tr., p. 93, ll. 12-15. Such a 
conclusion is not based on evaluation of demeanor, credibility or testimony, but upon a mistaken 
and constricted view of the significance of the purported "agreement" between the parties. 
4. The Trial Court Acted Outside Its Discretion In Concluding A New Trial 
Would Produce A Different Outcome. 
The trial comi continues to make a similar mistake as it made in 1\;fosell J by granting 
judgment nov. It bases its conclusion that a different result would follow at a new trial on the 
presumed fact that the new jury will be instructed that Exhibit 1 constituted a contract: "the 
Court concludes that the jury on retrial will find contrary to the first jury by finding an express 
contract that Berryhill & Company breached by foiling to perform within a reasonable period of 
time." Supp. Tr., p. 107. This time, however, the subject matter of Exhibit 1 is a "buy-in," 
rather than a loan. Because of the myriad problems with this new theory, including the failure to 
plead, offer jury instructions, waiver, failure to preserve, and the other matters set forth above 
and previously, the trial comi simply could not conclude that a new trial would produce a 
different outcome. 
Thus. the trial court could not find that a different result would occur. 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Defendant continues to argue that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. 
9 12-120(3). The gravamen or Plaintiffs claim deals with a commercial transaction under Great 
Plains Equip. v. Nortlnvesl Pipeline Cmp., 136 Idaho 466,471, 36 P.3d 218. 223 (2001). 
further, Plaintiff alleges a commercial transaction and claimed entitlement to fees itself. R. Vol. 
I, p. 98, IL 19-22. See, Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462,469,259 P.3d 608,615 (2011). Thus, 
Defendant should be granted its attorney fees, including those on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, as well as those stated in Appellant's BrieC Defendant 
Berryhill & Company, Inc., respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's Order 
Granting New Trial and remand to the trial court to enter judgment on Plaintiff's Count I based 
upon the jury's special verdict at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This 
Daniel E. Williams 
Attorney for Def end ants/ Appellant 
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(;£.RJIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ~f- day ofJune, 2014, I served two copies of the foregoing 
instrument on opposing counsel as indicated below: 
Paul R. Magiantini 
Eagle Law Center 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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